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Serological surveillanceMiddle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infections continue to be a serious emerging disease
problem internationallywithwell over 1000 cases and amajor outbreak outside of theMiddle East region.While
the hypothesis that dromedary camels are the likely major source of MERS-CoV infection in humans is gaining
acceptance, conjecture continues over the original natural reservoir host(s) and speciﬁcally the role of bats in
the emergence of the virus. Dromedary camels were imported to Australia, principally between 1880 and 1907
and have since become a large feral population inhabiting extensive parts of the continent. Here we report
that during a focussed surveillance study, no serological evidence was found for the presence of MERS-CoV
in the camels in the Australian population. This ﬁnding presents various hypotheses about the timing of the
emergence and spread of MERS-CoV throughout populations of camels in Africa and Asia, which can be partially
resolved by testing sera from camels from the original source region, which we have inferred was mainly north-
western Pakistan. In addition, we identify bat species which overlap (or neighbour) the range of the Australian
camel population with a higher likelihood of carrying CoVs of the same lineage as MERS-CoV. Both of these
proposed follow-on studies are examples of “proactive surveillance”, a concept that has particular relevance to
a One Health approach to emerging zoonotic diseases with a complex epidemiology and aetiology.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Since the ﬁrst detection and isolation of the Middle East respiratory
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in September 2012 from a fatal
human case in Saudi Arabia [1], there have been more than 1000
human cases reported with a mortality rate of approximately 40%
[2]. Although the primary cases are limited to nations in the Arabian
Peninsula, secondary cases have been reported in many countries out-
side of the region, with the latest outbreak in South Korea already
claiming 36 lives with more than 185 conﬁrmed infections [3].l Health Laboratory, Geelong,
.wang@duke-nus.edu.sg
. This is an open access article underIn contrast to the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus
(SARS-CoV), which was introduced into the human population through
a single or a limited number of spill-over event(s) [4,5], current epide-
miological studies suggest that there have been multiple introductions
of different MERS-CoV strains into human population from animal
reservoir(s) [6]. For SARS-CoV, there is now increasing evidence indi-
cating that it is a bat-borne virus transmitted to humans via intermedi-
ate hosts such as palm civets and raccoon dogs [7–11]. For MERS-CoV,
the natural reservoir host(s) has not yet been determined, nor how dif-
ferent strains of the virus have been transmitted to human populations
on multiple occasions since its ﬁrst discovery in 2012 [6]. Although
there are reports of MERS-like CoVs in different bats around the
world, discovery of closely related viruses and virus-neutralising anti-
bodies in dromedary camels has led to the hypothesis that they are
likely to be the major reservoir of MERS-CoV and camel-to-human
transmission is the main route of spill-over events [6]. However, it isthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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populations recently or whether it has adapted to camels as a natural
reservoir from ancient times. A retrospective search for MERS-CoV anti-
bodies indicated that the virus was circulating among the camel popu-
lations in the Middle East and Africa as early as 1992 and 1983,
respectively [12–15]. In a recent study, the detection of a MERS-CoV
conspeciﬁc virus from an African bat suggests that the MERS-CoV may
have originated from anAfrican bat, followed by bat-to-camel transmis-
sion in Africa, then the introduction of MERS-CoV to the Middle East
through camel exportation/importation [6,16].
In this context, it was hypothesized that examining the serological
status of Australian camelsmay help elucidatewhenMERS-CoV entered
the camel population. Dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) were
introduced into Australia from the mid-19th century to assist with
exploration and development of the arid centre of the continent [17].
Between 1840 and 1907 many thousands of camels were imported
into Australia, into an area ranging from Central Australia to the De
Grey River in Western Australia. As rail services extended north to
Alice Springs in Central Australia in 1929, and with the subsequent
growth of motor transport, many working camels were turned loose
and their feral progeny were able to survive and breed in the desert.
Since this time, the feral camel population in central Australia has un-
dergone an exponential increase. In 1966, the population was estimated
to be 15,000–20,000, and by the mid-1980s the estimate increased to a
minimum population of 43,000 [18]. By 2008, the minimum population
was re-estimated to be about 1 million animals [19], and there was in-
creasing concern of the economic, social and environmental damage
the uncontrolled population was causing [20]. In response, plans have
been adopted for population control, including a large culling operation
between 2010 and 2014, when over 150,000 camels were killed [21].
Currently Australia has the largest herd of camels anywhere in the
world, and the only population of wild camels. Long-term sustainable
control measures to permanently maintain a lower population density
are focused on developing a viable commercialisation, particularly
based onmustering to process meat for human consumption for the ex-
port market.
As a ﬁrst step toward a risk assessment of potential bat-to-camel
transmission of MERS-CoV like pathogens in Australia, we examined
the current camel distribution in Australia and its overlap with the hab-
itat of native bat species related to those from which MERS-CoV-like
viruses have been detected. Furthermore, we conducted a MERS-CoV
sero-prevalence study onmore than 300 camel serumsamples collected
from three different locations at four time points from December 2013
to August 2014.
Materials and methods
Camel serum sampling
Blood or serum samples were collected from two locations, an abat-
toir that processes wild caught and farmed camels mainly for export,
and from an area nearbyAlice Springs, Northern Territory during amus-
ter for the Department of Agriculture. Samples were collected on the
16th December 2013, 22nd January 2014, 17th April 2014 and 6th Au-
gust 2014, respectively (see Table 1 for detail). This studywas approved
by both the Federal and State Agricultural Departments via the Animal
Health Committee and by the Federal Department of Health in Australia.Table 1
Camel serum samples collected in this study.
Sample# Provider of samples Date of collection Animal originated from
1–31 Abattoir 16-12-2013 Central Australia
32–131 Abattoir 22-01-2014 Central Australia
132–231 Abattoir 17-04-2014 Central Australia
232–307 Camel muster 06-08-2014 Central AustraliaLuminex antibody test
A Luminex-based assay was developed using recombinant nucleo-
capsid (N) proteins of MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV using methodology
established in our group for henipaviruses [22]. Recombinant CoV N
proteins were produced in E. coli and puriﬁed directly from SDS-PAGE
gels as previously described [23]. For coating onto Luminex beads,
a total of 100 μg each of the two N proteins were coupled onto 100 μl
of bead set 28 (SARS-CoV) and bead set 34 (MERS-CoV), respectively.
Brieﬂy, coupled microsphere sets were vortexed and sonicated prior
to dilution in PBS-T containing 2% skim milk and transferred to 96-
well plate. The diluent was removed using an automated magnetic
vacuum manifold followed by the addition of 100 μl of camel sera di-
luted 1:100 in PBS-T and incubated, shaking for 30min at room temper-
ature. Positive control camel sera used in this assay were derived from
the natural infection of dromedary camels in Egypt during 2013 as
part of a seroepidemiology study [24]. The serum was removed and
the platewaswashed twicewith PBS-T followed by addition of Biotinyl-
ated Protein A (Pierce, Rockford, USA) and Protein G (Pierce, Rockford,
USA) conjugates and incubated as described above. The conjugate was
removed and the beads washed twice with PBS-T followed by addition
of Streptavidin–phycoerythrin (Qiagen Pty Ltd, Australia) and a ﬁnal
incubation as described above. Assays were performed on a Bio-Plex
Protein Array System integrated with Bio-Plex Manager Software
(v 6.0) (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc., CA, USA). Results were recorded as
median ﬂorescent intensity (MFI).
Virus neutralisation test (VNT)
VNT was conducted as previously described for SARS-CoV [10,25].
Brieﬂy, each camel serum was tested in duplicate by doubling dilution
in EMEM starting at 1:10 out to 1:1280. To 50 μl of sera an equal volume
of EMEM containing 200 TCID50 of a Dromedary camel isolate of MERS
virus [24] was added and incubated for 30 min at 37 °C. Vero cells were
then added to each well and the plates incubated at 37 °C and subse-
quently read for the presence of cytopathic effect (CPE) after 4 days.
Neutralising titres were recorded at the dilution at which at least one
duplicate well was negative for CPE. The same positive control camel
sera were used in this assay.
Analysis of the distributions of the Australian feral camels and potential
MERS-CoV reservoir bat species
MERS-CoV belongs to a distinct lineage (“C”) of the beta-coronavirus
genus [26]. This lineage was initially deﬁned from isolates from sam-
pling in Hong Kong where two species of lineage C β-CoV were de-
scribed: “Ty-Bat CoV HKU4” and “Pi-Bat CoV HKU5” [6].
On the assumption that lineage C β-CoVs aremore likely to be found
in Australianbats of the same genus as those fromwhich they have been
isolated overseas, we surveyed the peer-reviewed literature and the
GenBank sequence repository for lineage C β-CoV - bat genera associa-
tions. Consequently, we identiﬁed seven Australian microbat species
belonging to the families Vespertilionidae and Emballonuridae that
satisﬁed this criterion.
There is little published literature on these seven species, and to de-
termine potential overlap of their distribution with those of camels, we
undertook habitat modelling distribution usingMaxent version 3.3 [27].
As input for themodelling, we used the locational data storedwithin the
Atlas of Living Australia (ALA) online database, which collates data on
museum collections and sightings for most bat species of Australia
(http://www.ala.org.au/). Predictor variables used were all the BioClim
bioclimatic variables, Australian Land Use and Management Classiﬁca-
tion Version 7 and the NVIS Major Vegetation Subgroups (Version 4.1).
Allmodellingwas undertaken at the resolution of 0.008° (30 s) using
the WGS84 projection.
Fig. 1. The area predicted by Maxent to be potentially occupied by camels in central Australia
distribution in 2008 (at their maximum population size) estimated by Saalfeld and Edwards (2
Table 2
Luminex and VNT results of selected serum samples⁎.
Samples Luminex reading
(MFU)
VNT titre for
MERS-CoV
SARS N MERS N
No serum control 79 79 ND
Horse control serum 200 593 ND
Horse SARS hyperimmune serum 29,319 5649 ND
Camel control serum 147 191 neg
Camel MERS positive serum 178 8127 1:800
Saudi Arabia 2313016868 ND ND 1:400
Saudi Arabia 2313016870 ND ND 1:1600
Saudi Arabia 2313016872 ND ND 1:800
Saudi Arabia 2313016874 ND ND N1:6400
Saudi Arabia 2313016876 ND ND 1:800
Saudi Arabia 2313016880 ND ND 1:3200
Saudi Arabia 2313016882 ND ND 1:800
Saudi Arabia 2313016884 ND ND N1:6400
Saudi Arabia 2313016886 ND ND 1:800
Saudi Arabia 2313016888 ND ND 1:3200
Australian camel serum 1 153 655 neg
Australian camel serum 2 112 827 neg
Australian camel serum 3 131 480 neg
Australian camel serum 4 95 518 neg
Australian camel serum 5 148 733 neg
Australian camel serum 20 1256 509 neg
Australian camel serum 32 128 205 neg
Australian camel serum 33 121 256 neg
Australian camel serum 34 155 210 neg
Australian camel serum 35 172 170 neg
Australian camel serum 36 122 205 neg
Australian camel serum 54 205 1377 neg
Australian camel serum 132 104 458 neg
Australian camel serum 133 165 353 neg
Australian camel serum 134 124 389 neg
Australian camel serum 135 106 209 neg
Australian camel serum 136 95 189 neg
Australian camel serum 232 433 722 neg
Australian camel serum 233 137 172 neg
Australian camel serum 234 188 204 neg
Australian camel serum 235 161 202 neg
Australian camel serum 236 166 209 neg
⁎ For the complete list of all 307 Australian camel serum samples, please see online
Supplementary Table S1. ND, not done; neg, no neutralisation at a dilution of 1:10.
78 G. Crameri et al. / One Health 1 (2015) 76–82To determine if any of the selected bat species overlap the distribu-
tion of feral camels in central Australia, we undertook a similarMaxent
habitat distribution modelling exercise for the latter. For this we
used the “CamelScan” online database (http://www.feralscan.org.au/
camelscan/) in addition to the sightings in the ALA. Modelling results
were compared to the consolidated sighting and survey map published
by Saalfeld and Edwards [19].Results
Absence of MERS-CoV antibodies in Australian camels
Two different testing platforms were used to detect MERS-CoV anti-
bodies in Australian camels. A Luminex assay based on the conserved
and cross-reactive N proteins of both SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV was
used to detect any antibodies cross reactive with either of these two vi-
ruseswhereas theMERS-CoV speciﬁc VNTwas employed to conﬁrm the
potential presence of MERS-CoV infection in Australian camels as the
VNT assay is known to be speciﬁc for MERS-CoV, and there is no cross-
neutralisation between MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV or bovine-CoV [28].
As the results for all the Australian camels were negative by both
Luminex and VNT assays for all 307 camel sera tested in this study,
only results from selected serum samples (ﬁve individual samples
from each batch) are given in Table 2 to allow a clearer presentation
of the ﬁndings (see the full list in the online Supplementary Table S1).
While the positive control camel sera produced neutralisation titres
ranging from 1:400 to N1:6400, all of the Australian camel sera had a
neutralising titre to MERS-CoV b1:10.
For the Luminex assay, therewere only two samples giving a reading
above 1000 MFI, the set cut-off for background binding. As shown in
Table 2, serum 20 has MFU readings of 1256 and 509 for SARS-CoV
and MERS-CoV N proteins, respectively, while serum 54 has 205 and
1377, respectively. However, in comparison to the MFU readings of
positive control sera (ranging from 8127 to 29,319), these low range
“potentially positive” readings were considered to be non-conclusive.
The clear negative VNT results for these two samples conﬁrmed that
they did not contain MERS-CoV antibody.based on sighting data. For comparison, the dashed line indicates the extent of the camel
010) [19].
Table 3
Bat families and genera in which lineage C β-CoVs have been identiﬁed and the number of species in these identiﬁed genera that are native to mainland Australia.
Family Genus Country lineage C β-CoV
isolated/sequenced
Number of isolates/unique
sequences in Genbank
References to the isolates/sequences
of the lineage C β-CoV
Number of bat species of the
genus native to Australia
Vespertilionidae Eptesicus Spain/Italy 2 [40,41] 0
Vespertilionidae Hypsugo Spain/Italy 2 [40,42] 0
Vespertilionidae Neoromicia South Africa 1 [16] 0
Vespertilionidae Nyctalus Italy 1 [42] 0
Vespertilionidae Pipistrellus Hong Kong/Italy/Romania
/Ukraine/Netherlands
28 [42–46] 2
Vespertilionidae Tylonycteris Hong Kong/China 15 [43,44,47] 0
Vespertilionidae Vespertilio China 1 [48] 0
Emballonuridae Taphozous Saudi Arabia 1 [36] 5
Nycteridae Nycteris Ghana 3 [45] 0
Molossidae Nyctinomops Mexico 1 [49] 0
Mormoopidae Pteronotus Mexico 1 [50] 0
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The total area predicted by theMaxentmodelling to be potentially
suitable for feral camels in Australia is 1,716,196 km2 (Fig. 1). This is
less than the area identiﬁed by Saalfeld and Edwards [19] and may
reﬂect the intensive culling during 2009–10 undertaken to reduce
the impact of feral camels on the environment [21]. Note that the
Australian camel can be considered one population, as there are no
natural geographical boundaries leading to the formation of sub-
populations.
In total, we found 14 papers describing 56 unique isolates or se-
quences of lineage C β-CoV frommicrobats from Europe, Africa, Central
America and East Asia, belonging to 11 genera (Table 3). The majority
(89%) of the bat hosts from which the β-CoV C were isolated or se-
quenced belong to the family Vespertilionidae.
Comparison with the list of native species resident within main-
land Australia showed 7 species, with 2 belonging to the genera
Pipistrellus (Fam: Vespertilionidae) and 5 belonging to Taphozous
(Fam: Emballonuridae) (Table 4). Of these 7 species, 2 are conﬁned to
the east coast of Australia, 4 have distributions bordering (but not over-
lapping) that of the camels, and only 1 species (Taphozous hilli) has a
home range with signiﬁcant overlap (Fig. 2).
Discussions
The feral camels in Australia represent the largest “herd” in the
world, and furthermore, is the only free-ranging one. The origin of this
population is not known for certain, as no records were kept during
importation. However, the considered opinion is that they were main-
ly imported from British India [29]. This is also consistent with the his-
torical records about the cameleers, who worked with the camels,
who originated from the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan
[30]. Furthermore, genetic studies have shown little genetic diversity
in the Australian camel population, indicative of a strong “founder
effect” [31], which suggests that the introductions were sourcedTable 4
Australian bat species belonging to the genera shown to harbour lineage C β-CoVs (Table 3) and
population.
Species Family Common name Extent of ho
Maxentmod
recorded in
Pipistrellus adamsi Vespertilionidae Forest pipistrelle 85,676
Pipistrellus westralis Vespertilionidae Northern pipistrelle, 99,161
Taphozous georgianus Emballonuridae Common sheath-tailed bat 350,588
Taphozous hilli Emballonuridae Hill's sheath-tailed bat 172,119
Taphozous kapalgensis Emballonuridae Arnhem sheath-tailed bat 113,442
Taphozous australis Emballonuridae Coastal sheath-tailed bat Insufﬁcient
Taphozous troughtoni Emballonuridae Troughton's sheath-tailed bat No locationfrom a restricted area. Therefore, pending conﬁrmatory genetic studies
of the northwest Pakistani camel populations, a working hypothesis is
that the Australian feral camel population is derived from this area.
It is impossible to know for certain if the camels imported over
100 years ago from Pakistan carried MERS-CoV. Even if they did, it is
possible that it was extinguished during the sea voyage. Alternatively,
if the virus did manage to infect the Australian camel population, it is
also plausible that it failed to establish long term sustained transmission
due to the low population density of the camels when they were re-
leased into central Australia in the 1920s. Nevertheless, we propose
that a careful collation of all the virological and ecological evidence
will enable a reasoned assessment of the most probable status of the
ancestors of the feral camels at the time of importation. Speciﬁcally,
we suggest that investigations in Pakistan (as well as neighbouring
Afghanistan and Iran) will provide an important piece of evidence, as
to date there have not been any published reports of the MERS-CoV
sero-status of these camel populations. Following on from this, if sam-
pling in these countries show that MERS-CoV is not present in the cur-
rent population, then the most probable explanation is that the virus
was unlikely to have ever been introduced into Australia. By contrast,
if the virus is found to be present, genetic studies of the virus may be
able to partially resolve when it entered into the population, and thus
if the camels exported to Australia might have been infected.
If as suggested, sero-surveys of camels are undertaken in western
Asia and they are found to be negative, the results will also have wider
implications than answering the question of whether MERS-CoV
was ever present in Australia. To date the geographical origin of MERS-
CoV is controversial, as although the disease is largely conﬁned to the
Arabian Peninsula, examination of stored serum collected in Sudan
and Somalia from 1983 to 1984 has showed very high seropositivity
for MERS-CoV [32]. As MERS-CoV has now been shown to be wide-
spread throughout camel populations in northern, western and eastern
Africa [33], there exists a plausible bat reservoir for aMERS-CoV ancestor
[16], and there is a large export of camels from eastern Africa into the
Arabian Peninsula [34], then a current working hypothesis is thatthe extent towhich their estimated home range overlaps that of the Australian feral camel
me range estimated by
elling from sightings
the ALA (km2)
Estimated home range overlap between bat species and
camels (%)
0%
0%
0%
84.16%
0%
data points Assumed to be 0% as conﬁned to the east coast of Australia
data held within ALA Assumed to be 0% as conﬁned to the east coast of Australia
Fig. 2. The home range estimated by Maxent modelling of the 5 selected species in Table 2 which overlap of are relatively closeby the distribution of the central Australian feral camels;
(a) P. adamsi, (b) P. westralis; (c) T. georgianus; (d) T. hilli; and (e) T. kapalgensis.
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ever, as other regional sources of the virus have not been investigated,
the true geographical spread of the virus is not determinedwith certain-
ty. Thus, a ﬁnding of an absence of MERS-CoV in the populations of
camels in Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Australia would support the
hypothesis that camels are not the original reservoir host of the MERS-
CoV virus, and that a spillover event from a bat species into the camel
population happened in relatively recent time.
Our assumption that Australian native bats are more likely to harbor
lineage C β-CoVs if they belong to a genera from which these viruses
have been isolated overseas requires some justiﬁcation. The basis for it
is the evidence for considerable co-evolution of α-CoV and β-CoV
with their chiropteran hosts at the genus level [35]. Note that this
does not apply at the family level, as both alpha and beta viruses occur
in many chiropteran families [35].The bat species (T. hilli) with a home that overlaps the central
Australian camel distribution occupies a comparatively large area and
occurs in an area of high camel density. As it is related to the species
(Taphozous perforatus) from which a sequence almost identical to that
of the index case of MERS-CoV was isolated in Saudi Arabia in 2012
[36], T. hilliwould seem to be the priority for virological sampling. How-
ever, the sequence obtained from T. perfortatus was a single, short se-
quence (203 nucleotides), has not been independently conﬁrmed and
no actual isolate has subsequently been obtained [6]. By contrast, a
virus from a species which occurs throughout east and southern Africa
(Neoromicia capensis) has yielded a full genome sequence, which de-
spite having less identity with MERS-CoV and not occurring in the Ara-
bian Peninsula, is considered a more plausible natural reservoir [6]. As
this species occurs within the family Vestpertilionidae, from which the
majority of the lineage C β-CoV isolates have been obtained (Table 3),
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Vestpertilionidae species which occur to the north of the current
camel distribution (Fig. 2) also be undertaken.With the recent advance
of multiple serological proﬁling tools using a synthetic virome epitope
library [37], it is theoretically feasible to examine total infection proﬁles
of both bats and camels in the overlapped geographical locations. Such
inter-species serological comparison will undoubtedly shed new light
on the real risk and occurrence of spill-over events happening between
these two groups of wildlife animals.
The concept of “active surveillance”, whereby surveys are undertaken
to detect and measure the extent of a disease or pathogen is well
established in public and animal health. While such active surveillance
has a role in emerging infectious diseases (EIDs), it has obvious limitations
in that it can only occur after the disease has emerged. Furthermore, there
are challenges with diagnostics and the difﬁculty and expense of survey-
ing for diseases of low prevalence, which is the situation for many EIDs in
their initial stages. An approachwhich is gaining increasing recognition in
the EID sciences is the use of “proactive surveillance”whereby potential
“hotspots” for emergence and/or “reservoirs” are selected for surveys.
We have provided an example of this “new” type of surveillancewhereby
we were able to recommend speciﬁc bat species to proactively target for
sampling, and propose that this is particularly appropriate within the
“One Health” approach to emerging infectious diseases.
Conclusion
At a ﬁrst glance, it might seem that assessing the sero-status of feral
camels, and the presence of CoVs in bats with potential contact with
these camels has little relevance to understanding the epidemiology and
evolution of MERS-CoV in the Arabian Peninsula. However, such are the
complexities of the virus and the disease that many key discoveries
have been made by examining animals at the margin of the problem
areas. The initial discovery that camels might be the principal reservoir
of MERS-CoV arose following exploratory testing of camel serum collect-
ed from the Canary Islands, which then led onto amore systematic survey
of camels from the Arabian Peninsula [38]. Similarly, the discovery of a
plausible ancestor virus to MERS-CoV arose from the sampling of a bat
species in South Africa, even though the species does not occur within
the Arabian Peninsula [16,39]. The important lesson from these examples
is that when dealing with an emerging infectious disease with a complex
epidemiology, conventional outbreak investigations may not resolve key
questions, and thus there is a need for studies which might appear tan-
gential. Some of these, as in the examples cited, might result in important
discoveries, but it needs to be accepted that most will not. However, we
argue that within the context of “proactive surveillance”, then negative
survey results can be immensely important in directing attention to
where effort is needed, which in our example, is our recommendation
for a follow-on sero-survey of camels in western Asia.
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.onehlt.2015.10.003.
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